slatterysec.com/reports/2026/09/2026-08-21_2026-08-25-honeypot-report.html
sensors 8 up last session 4m ago 24h captures 312 unique src 87

slattery@sec:~/reports$ cat 2026-08-21_2026-08-25-honeypot-report.md

HONEYPOT REPORT  //  2026-08-21 – 2026-08-25

2026-08-21 – 2026-08-25 — SSH, Telnet + Web Honeypot Report

period   2026-08-21 – 2026-08-25
sensors   Cowrie SSH/telnet + web deception panel
host   VPS · containerized
SSH TELNET WEB VOLUME SPIKE DAREDEVIL
SSH + TELNET SESSIONS
50,517
5 days
UNIQUE SOURCES
1,626
shell sensor
AUTH ATTEMPTS
50,067
2,533 succeeded
PAYLOAD RETRIEVALS
505
15 uploads
WEB REQUESTS
22,235
742 unique IPs
NEW TOKEN CONSUMERS
72
not seen before

SSH and telnet volume by day

3,140
08-21
30,987
08-22
3,196
08-23
7,383
08-24
5,811
08-25

Executive summary

August 22 carries 30,987 sessions against a baseline near 3,000, and almost all of it is one host. 39.101.69.5 opened 27,024 sessions in a single day — 53% of the period — from an Alibaba Cloud address. Removing it leaves five days that run between 3,100 and 7,400, which is the honest shape of the period.

The credential list has changed character. The top two pairs are not credentials at all: enable\0 / linuxshell\0 and system\0 / shell\0, 1,599 and 1,592 attempts. Those are vendor CLI escape commands being submitted into the username and password fields, null terminators included. The tooling is not guessing passwords, it is trying to break out of an embedded device menu through the login prompt.

Below them sit the IoT defaults that have been constant all summer — root/xc3511, root/vizxv, admin/admin — the standard Mirai credential set.

A new family appeared: daredevil, served from 176.65.139.202 across five ARM and MIPS variants. No x86 build was offered at all. Unlike the spray loaders that fetch eleven architectures and let ten fail, this one ships only for embedded targets — the operator knows what they are aiming at.

On the token side, the SES quota checker at 192.253.248.142 passed its first full week, still re-fetching the source .env roughly 1,030 times a day rather than caching the key. Seventy-two previously unseen consumers appeared during the period, mostly account-profiling calls.

Notable sessions

2026-08-22 VOLUME ANOMALY 39.101.69.5
27,024 sessions in one day from a single Alibaba Cloud host, responsible for over half the period's SSH traffic.
sessions: 27,024 of 50,517
client: SSH-2.0-Go
effect: the daily chart is meaningless without excluding it
note: no payload retrieval followed — volume without delivery
2026-08-21 → 08-25 NEW FAMILY 176.65.139.202
A loader serving five embedded-only architectures under the name daredevil, plus a separate telnet stager.
binaries: daredevil.armv5l, armv6l, armv7l, mips, mipsel
absent: no x86, x86_64, ppc, sparc or sh4 build offered
stager: hxxp://176.65.139.202:80/telnet.sh, 43 retrievals
assessment: targeted at routers, cameras and DVRs specifically rather than sprayed
2026-08-21 → 08-25 CLI ESCAPE distributed
Vendor shell-escape commands submitted as credentials, null terminators intact.
pairs: enable\0/linuxshell\0 (1,599), system\0/shell\0 (1,592)
also: sh\0 / /bin/busybox UNSTABLE\0 (519)
note: the login prompt is being used as a command channel, not an authentication step

The decoy population

5,442 config retrievals from 55 sources, of which 5,067 are the SES checker re-reading its own source. The remaining 375 come from 54 distinct actors — roughly 75 a day, which is the steady-state rate for an exposed .env on a host nobody has a reason to target.

The credential-chain detector has still never fired.

Indicators

Busiest shell sources

sourcesessions
39.101.69.527,024
164.92.115.221,496
92.204.138.441,164
91.92.42.168785
77.239.124.250785
91.92.42.68785
91.92.42.61784
45.156.87.166773

Payload URLs

urlretrievals
hxxp://2.26.136.128/twget.sh100
hxxp://176.65.139.202:80/telnet.sh43
hxxp://185.93.89.72/wget26
hxxp://176.65.139.202/daredevil.armv7l26
hxxp://176.65.139.202/daredevil.mips21
hxxp://176.65.139.202/daredevil.mipsel21
hxxp://176.65.139.202/daredevil.armv5l21
hxxp://176.65.139.202/daredevil.armv6l20
hxxp://176.65.139.202/daredevil.x86_6419
hxxp://176.65.139.202/daredevil.armv4l15

Most attempted credentials

usernamepasswordattempts
enable\0linuxshell\01,599
system\0shell\01,592
sh\0/bin/busybox UNSTABLE\0519
adminadmin356
rootadmin352
rootxc3511218
rootroot209
rootvizxv189
root123456163
rootdefault152

Web sensor — most probed paths

pathrequests
/index.php267
/fetch135
/view.php119
/download.php115
/read.php113
/home.php110
/page.php110
/robots.txt85

Payload hashes

sha256what it is
94f2e4d8d4436874785cd14e6e6d403507b8750852f7f2040352069a75da4c00
virustotal →
sshd — Go worm, PAM credential theft, dual miner, Discord C2 (8 uploads)

MITRE ATT&CK mapping

IDtechniqueobserved as
T1595.001Active Scanning: Scanning IP Blocks27,024 sessions from one host in 24 hours with no payload delivery
T1110.001Brute Force: Password Guessing50,067 attempts; Mirai default set root/xc3511, root/vizxv
T1059.004Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix ShellVendor CLI escapes submitted through the login fields with null terminators
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer505 retrievals; daredevil in five embedded architectures from 176.65.139.202
T1552.001Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files5,442 config decoy retrievals from 55 sources
T1496Resource HijackingRedtail multi-architecture upload set; SES quota polling continues at ~1,030/day